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Understanding the degree and evolution of competition across industries is an important step 
towards understanding the impact of economic reform and competition on economic growth 
in  Vietnam  during  the  economic  transition.  In  this  paper,  we  investigate  evolution  of 
competition in Vietnam during the economic transition using the Price-Cost Margin (PCM) or 
Mark-up that has been widely applied in the economic literature and the Profit Elasticity (PE) 
recently developed by Boone (2000). This paper provides the first empirical study of intensity 
and evolution of competition across selected industries in Vietnam in the last decade using 
firm-level data from the Vietnam Enterprise Census (VEC) conducted annually since 2000 by 
the Vietnam General Statistical Office (GSO). 
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Vietnam  initiated  the  economic  reform  “doi  moi”  in  mid-1980s.  The  reform  was  then 
deepened in 1990s. Introductions of the first Enterprise Law in 2000, Unified Enterprise Law 
in 2005, Competition Law in 2005, and more international integration such as WTO accession 
in 2006 have helped untie business practices and stimulated competition. These economic 
policies  are  expected  to  generate  more  competitive  business  environment  in  the  Vietnam 
economy. 
Understanding the relationship between competition and economic performance is critical to 
developing  industries and  constructing  competition  policy  and regulations for a  transition 
economy.  However, we currently have little information on the degree of competition and its 
evolution in the majority of economic sectors in Vietnam during the transition to a market 
economy. To fill this gap, this paper examines extent and evolution of competition in the 
economy. This paper was expected to involve answering the following questions: (a) How 
competitive are across industries in Vietnam? (b) How does the competition evolve during the 
recent transition? To some extent, the paper provides evidence of the effects of economic 
reform and pro-competitive policies on the competition intensity. 
This study aims to provide a broad picture of competition across the Vietnam industries rather 
than  detailed  analysis  of  clearly-defined,  specific  markets  that  are  the  provenance  of 
competition agencies and well beyond the focus of this paper.  The primary data source for 
the  analysis  is  the  Vietnam  Enterprise  Census  (VEC),  a  micro  firm-level  dataset.  Firms‟ 
sectors are classified according to their major economic activities rather than their products or 
services.  Because of the available data, our primary focus for definitions of „the market‟ will 
relate to standard industrial definition using the Vietnam Standard Industrial Classification 
(VSIC). From VEC2006
1 onward GSO used two VSIC classification systems, VSIC1993 and 
VSIC2007, but to have a unique classification for all the censuses  we use the VSIC1993 to 
define markets. 
In this paper we  first discuss measures  of competition. We  will pay more attention to  a 
recently developed measure of competition that is widely believed to be robust to some of the 
problems that the conventional measures face in the empirical analysis of competition. We 
calculate two measures of competition  – the Price-Cost Margin (PCM) and Profit Elasticity 
(PE) – for a range of selected industries in Vietnam. These measurement outputs provide 
                                            
1 This census was conducted in 2007 but collected data on firm activities in 2006, for short we named VEC2006.  
inputs for future research such as determinants of competition, and impact of competition on 
firm performance.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  In section 2, we discuss background on 
economic transition in Vietnam and key pro-competitive shocks in the current years. Section 
3 briefly reviews the nature and methods for measuring competition. Section 4 is for the data 
and  model  used.  In  section  5,  we  present  our  results  for  Vietnam  industries.  Section  6 
concludes and discusses avenues for future research. 
2. Background 
 
The failure of Soviet-stylized economic system in Russia and East European economies in 
1980s and early 1990s forced the Vietnam government to carry out the economic reform in 
mid-1980s and deepened the reform in early 1990s when the Soviet bloc massively collapsed. 
The  economic  reform  or  transition  in  Vietnam  has  led  to  great  economic  growth  and 
economic  structure  changes.  Vietnam  has  experienced  impressively  economic  growth  and 
poverty reduction over the last 20 years. The real GDP per capita has increased remarkably from 
US$98 in 1990 to more than US$1,000 in 2009 (IMF, 2010). Economic activities were untied 
thank to the transition; households and businesses have had more autonomy in economic 
activities. A great increase in number of firms is observed in the last decade from the first 
Enterprise Law introduction in 2000, from about 42,000 firms to more than 240,000 firms in 
2009,
2 is  a  good  example  (GSO,  2010a;  VEC,  2009).  There  is  a  significant   shift  of 
employment structure between industries during the last 10 years.  In 2009, the agriculture, 
forestry and fishing sector makes up 52% of employment, a considerable decline from about 
70% in 1999 (GSO, 2010b).  
The sharp rise in number of firms over the last decade may be a good signal of competition in 
Vietnam, number of state owned enterprises  (SOEs) declined markedly from about 5,760 in 
2000 to 3,200 in 2009 (VEC, 2000 & 2009). This could reflect the shrinking government‟s 
direct intervention in economic activities and be good for competition. But in fact a relatively 
small number of SOEs accounts for almost number of large firms in the economy, and still 
accounts for a high proportion of total investment capital (more than 40%) (GSO, 2010a), 
controls important economic industries and keeps having privileges from the government. 
One may argue that the large SOE monopolies would continue to dominate markets and thus 
private sector would not be able to develop well (e.g. Hersch, Kemme & Bhandari et al, 1994). 
                                            
2  These  figures  do  not  include  economic  householders  such  as  farmers,  shopkeepers,  fishermen,  small 
unregistered businesses. etc.  
Additionally, that the sharp growth of number of firms is dominated by private sector may not 
be as dynamic and competitive as the growing number of businesses suggests because the 
number of newly registered firms may be a misleading indicator of private sector expansion 
(Hakkala  &  Kokko,  2007)  and  competition  intensity  improvement.  The  fact  that  newly 
established private firms have mostly medium, small, and micro sizes (Hakkala & Kokko, 
2007), as well as unwillingness and ambiguousness of the Communist Party to equitize and 
privatize the SOEs, implies the incomplete economic transition to a market economy and low 
competitiveness in Vietnam.  
However, Vietnam is an open economy; foreign trade turnover is very high, 160% of GDP 
(Doan & Gibson, 2010) of which import turnover has been always higher than export since 
early  1990s.  Therefore,  import  penetration  would  increase  intensity  of  competition  in 
Vietnam  economy  as  observed  in  many  other  economies  including  transition  economies 
(Bugamelli et al, 2009; Chen, Imbs & Scott, 2009; Konings et al, 2003; Raff & Wagner, 
2010). Put all together, we expect an increasing trend of competition  intensity during the 
economic transition due to economic openness and pro-competitive policy introductions in 
Vietnam.  
Given  the  fact  that  many  factors  may  affect  competition  intensity  in  different  ways,  the 
question  remains  whether  competition  intensity  increases  significantly  in  a  transition 
economy of Vietnam over the last decade given the fact that there is a rapid increase in 
number of firms due to economic transition. If it is not the case, then an increasing number of 
firms over the transition may not be a good indicator of competition. A robust measure of 
competition is essential to uncover the evolution of competition in this sense.  
3. Competition measures 
3.1 Competition definition 
Competition is a widely used concept in economics. In the 18
th century, Adam Smith started 
using the concept and evaluated impacts of competition on economic efficiency. However, so 
far there is no a unique definition and complete understanding about competition.  Many tried 
to visit and revisit the meaning of competition in economics, for instance, Lerner (1934), 
Stigler  (1957),  McNulty  (1968),  and  Boone  (2000,  2008).  Although  there  is  no  unique 
definition of competition, firm‟s market power or extent of monopoly is widely used as an 
indicator of competition. Monopoly means a firm has market power to profitably raise price 
over marginal cost. On the contrary, competition results in decline in profits of all firms if  
they have the same marginal costs. Competition may also lead to reallocation effect, more 
efficient firms will expand market shares on the cost of less efficient firms as they can use 
their cost advantage more aggressively and then force the least efficient firms to exit the 
market. These two opposing effects imply selection effect (Boone, 2000). The easiness of 
market entry makes the market is more competitive. Therefore, competition is associated with 
the decrease in firm‟s market concentration and profits or total industry profits, but Boone 
(2000) states that these properties are not always the case because many firms would increase 
profits in fiercer competition environment due to reallocation effect. 
3.2 Competition measures
3 
Competition is often measured by concentration rate, rents, price-cost margin (PCM) (also 
called mark-up or Lerner index), import penetration, and profit elasticity (PE) (see Domowitz 
et  al, 1986;  Blundell  et  al, 1999;  Nickell, 1996;  Boone, 2000  &  2008). Early  studies  of 
competition employed measures such as Concentration index (CI) or the Herfindahl Index 
(H).
4 More completive market has a lower CI or H.  The idea behind these indices is that the 
structure of the market is the determinant of competition. More concentrated markets are less 
competitive as some leading firms control large market shares  and have market power. The 
problem of this measure is that the structure of the market, in terms of the number of firms 
and their market shares, are themselves the outcomes of a competition process. For example, 
an increase in competition may reallocate market share s to more efficient firms with higher 
mark-ups, thus the Herfindahl  index actually  increases  rather  than  decreases  as  expected 
effect  of  competition  on  the  index.  In  other  words,  the  H  index  is  not  monotonically 
decreasing as competition intensity increases.  
Similarly, rents, PCM and import penetration are also not strictly monotonic (Boone, 2000, 
2008). For example, Amir (2003), Rosenthal (1980) and Stiglitz (1989) show that in some 
cases PCM still raises even competition increases. Likewise, a rise in import penetration will 
increase  competition  when  import  barriers  are  removed,  but  it  is  not  always  the  case  if 
domestic producers are more efficient than importers, the reallocation and selection effects 
still occur. In other case where there is collusion between domestic firms and foreign firms (or 
importers), such an increase in import penetration in these cases will not increase competition. 
In summary, the first four measures are not robust. However, in this paper we still employ the 
conventional PCM method as it is a popular empirical measure and well known as Lerner 
                                            
3 This subsection is heavily drawn from Devine, Doan, Mok, Kris and Stevens (2011). 
4 The Herfindahl Index is squared Concentration Index.  
Index in economics. In addition, if results from PCM measure support the PE measure, it 
would help to corroborate our findings. We now turn out to discuss the PCM measure and 
then pay more attention to  the profit elasticity (PE) which is believed to be  theoretically 
robust (Boone, 2000). 
3.2.1  Price Cost Margin 
Economists classify markets according to firms‟ ability to influence markets through market 
power.  Lerner  Index  or  Price-Cost  Margin  (PCM)  is  widely  used  to  measure  the  market 
power. The difference between price (pi) and marginal cost (ci) gauges levels of competition 
in  a  market.  If  the  difference  or  margin  is  nil,  that  is  pi  =  ci,  the  market  is  perfectly 
competitive  whereas  PCM  is  greater  than  zero,  firms  are  able  to  pose  prices  over  their 
marginal  cost.  If  the  margin  approaches  to  one  (theoretically)  the  market  is  purely 
monopolistic.  This  has  led  to  the  PCM  being  empirically  used  as  one  of  measures  of 
competition (Nickel, 1996; Schiersch & Ehmcke, 2010) and become a very popular measure 
of competition in economics. The PCM for firm i can be written as follows: 











PCM          (1) 
where pi and ci are the unit price and marginal cost of firm i. 
To  evaluate  competition  intensity  in  industries,  we  need  to  aggregate  firm‟s  PCM  up  to 
industrial levels by taking weighted mean of firm level PCMs. The firm‟ market share si is 
used as weight to capture the market power of big firms. The PCM measure of competition in 
a market or industry j is estimated as follows: 

















PCM         (2) 
PCM  measure  can  be  interpreted  as  when  competition  increases  PCM  decreases.  PCM 
measure has two main drawbacks. First, it is not a robust competition measure (Boone, 2000) 
because an increase in competition, e.g. the increasing number of firms in a market or an 
increase in competition among firms in recessions, does not always lead to lower PCM (Amir, 
2003;  Stiglitz,  1989).  Second,  PCM  measure  ignores  the  reallocation  effect.  In  a  fiercer 
competition, more efficient firms expand their market shares while the less efficient firms‟ 
market shares shrink. Consequently, the weighted average PCM may increase if the rise of 
more efficient firms‟ market share (si) is greater than the decrease in respective individual  
firm PCM. Thus, PCM indicator in this case may be misleading (Boone, 2000; Schiersch & 
Ehmcke, 2010). 
3.2.2  Relative profits and profit elasticity 
Consider a market where there is heterogeneity in PCMs due to differences in efficiency. An 
increase in competition is likely to have two effects: a reallocation and a selection effect. 
Profits  will  be  reallocated  from  less  efficient  firms  to  more  efficient  firms.  Competition 
adversely affects the profits of inefficient firms harder than those of more efficient firms. 
Inefficiency is more severely punished in a more competitive market (Boone, 2000 & 2008; 
Devine et al, 2011). The selection effect operates through firm exit; where the least efficient 
firms suffer losses and are forced to cease and exit the market, the exited firms leave behind 
their market shares and profits for more efficient firms, the survived firms then obtain higher 
PCMs.  The  weighted  average  PCM  for  an  industry  or  market  may  increase  or  decrease 
depending on the difference between decrease in individual firm PCM and reallocating output 
(increase in market shares) to firms with higher PCMs. 
Boone (2000) proposed a measure of competition and later in (2004, 2008) developed into a 
new measure of competition called Relative Profits  Differences  (RPD). The spirit of this 
measure is that competition rewards efficiency. A market maps marginal cost differentials 
between firms into profit differentials. An increase in competition may lead to a decrease in 
the output of firms, but the decrease will be higher for less efficient firms. Therefore, the 
market share for less efficient firms shrinks while that of more efficient firms increases.  
Let consider the case where there are two firms in a market with profits defined as () with 
the firms having different levels of efficiency ( where ’’ >'.  The RPD can be calculated 
as the ratio of the profits of the more efficient firm to the less efficient firm: 







  RPD             (3) 
The RPD can measure the impact of competition via its impact on the relative profits of the 
two firms.  If competition increases due to more firms entering the market for example, leads 
to higher the RPD. This is because as firms respond to the increase in competition will reduce 
the  profits  of  the  more  efficient  firm  by  less  than  inefficient  firm.  Thus,  profits  will  be 
reallocated from the less efficient firm (') to the more efficient firm (’’).    
Griffith et al. (2005) slightly modified the RPD to a more general case for many firms in a 
market that can be used to measure industry-wide measure of competition, Profit Elasticity 
(PE). The PE measures the response of profits to changes in marginal cost. When competition 
increases, inefficient firms take a greater decrease to profits than do more efficient firms. The 
advantages  of  this  measure  are  that,  under  certain  assumptions,  it  is  monotonic  with 
competition intensity and requires no further data as the other methods. These assumptions 
include firms being completely symmetric except for their marginal cost levels.  Boone (2000, 
2008)  also  assumes  that  firms  choose  their  strategic  variables  simultaneously  and 
independently. 
The PE measure is calculated by running an OLS regression of firms‟ profits () on their 
marginal cost. However, the marginal cost is often not available so average variable cost (avc) 
is used instead.  
      ij ij j ij avc        ln ln         (4) 
where  profit  equals  sales  (yi)  of  firm  i  minus  total  variable  cost  (tvci)  (labour  cost  and 
intermediate costs), and average variable cost equals to total variable cost (tvci) divided by 














  ln ln        (5) 
PE measures how much is change in profits of firms in industry j caused by a unit change in 
average cost.  In other words, the  coefficient measures the elasticity of profits with respect 
to changes in average cost. The coefficient  is expected to be negative, indicating that as 
firm average cost increases, profits of the firm will decrease.  In a more competitive market,  
will be more negative as profits are more sensitive to similar changes in average cost. 
The PE is robust to the ambiguity of the reallocation effect (Boone, 2000 & 2008). This 
feature is theoretically superior over other competition measures because PE is monotonic 
with  changes  in  competition  intensity  whereas  other  measures  such  as  the  PCM  are  not 
monotonic as PCM can increase even in fiercer competition conditions due to reallocation 
effect.   
However, there are a few assumptions underlying the PE measure that can make it biased 
(Creusen et al, 2006a & 2006b; Schiersch & Schmidt-Ehmcke, 2010). First, given that the 
indicator measures competition based on efficiency, it assumes that one is able to rank firms  
based  on  their  efficiency  (assuming  a  direct  relationship  between  efficiency  and  cost).  
Second, the indicator assumes symmetry in the market meaning that firms respond in the 
same way to changes in competition given their relative efficiency, „firm i‟s profits are the 
same as firm j‟s profits would be if firm j was in firm i‟s situation‟ (Athey & Schmutzler 
2001). This is to ensure that the results are due to changes in competition, and not due to 
changes to the industry structure. Third, the PE uses average cost instead of marginal cost 
because of data un-availability. Other problems are unobserved unlevel playing field (that 
tends to be in favour of the most efficient firm in a certain industry)  and problems with 
defining irrelevant market for firms thus affecting estimated coefficient (Boone, 2000). As 
these reasons, Boone noted that comparing competition between industries using PE measure 
may be nonsense, but changes in the measured competition intensity over time within an 
industry can tell the trend of competition in that industry. This paper focusing on examining 
evolution of competition during the economic transition matches well this measure.   
4. Data and methods 
The data used in this paper comes from the Vietnam Enterprise Census (VEC). The census 
was  conducted  annually  since  2000  by  the  Vietnam  Statistical  Office  (GSO).  The  VEC 
provides comprehensive information about firms and their activities in the first decade of the 
twenty  first  century.  The  survey  offers  information  on  demographic  data  of  firms,  firm 
ownership, business activities, employment, income of employment, assets, capital, business 
performance,  revenue,  profit,  detailed  information  for  each  production  sector  such  as 
manufacturing, transport, communication, restaurant, accommodation, education, agriculture, 
whole sales, retail etc.  
Industries or markets have been defined in this paper by the Vietnam Standard Industrial 
Classification  (VSIC)  4-digit  industry  level  codes.  This  is  standard  for  defining  possibly 
narrowest markets. If the definition of market is too broad, the estimated competition may 
overestimate or underestimate the true intensity of competition depending on relative cost and 
profit ratios of the added firms.  However, the 4-digit level market definition may  not be 
complete. Industries in this paper are defined according to firms‟ main economic activities, 
but markets can be also defined according to firm products, so one should bear in mind when 
interpreting the results. 
Our  analysis  is  restricted  by  usable  data.  We  removed  firms  without  tax  code  for  some 
reasons such as missing data or infant firms since we use the tax code as firm identifiers to  
merge and append data. Some 4-digit industries have very few firms that do not allow us to 
estimate  competition  intensity  using  regressions  such  as  PE,  we  drop  those  industries. 
However, one should bear in mind when considering issues of competition, these industries 
where there are a small number of players could be also of interest. The focus of this paper is 
the degree of competition  in  the  Vietnam one-digit  level  industries, not  to  study specific 
markets.   
In  addition,  we  exclude  some  industries  those  we  believe  either  the  current  data  do  not 
support  or  the  government  still  not  yet  treated  or  allowed  them  to  operate  in  a  market 
mechanism  because  of  the  Communist  Party‟s  political  doctrine.  These  industries  are 
„Agriculture, hunting, forestry and related services‟, „Fishing and aquaculture‟, „Personal and 
community  services‟,  „Electricity  and  water  supply‟,  „Recreational,  cultural  and  sports‟,  
„Healthcare & social work‟, „Education and training‟. The number of registered firms in the 
first  three  industries  does  not  include  millions  of  economic  householders  who  are  also 
producers  and  competitors  like  small  farmers,  fishermen,  café  owners,  shopkeepers  and 
barbers in the markets.
5 The current number of registered firms  in these industries does not 
reflect  sufficiently  number of  firms  in  the playing  field  and  competition  intensity.  For 
„Electricity and water supply‟ is simply state monopolistic as few state-owned enterprises has 
been so far operating in this industries. The last three industries have not been fully treated yet 
as profit making and financial self-sufficient ones in market mechanism by the government 
and current laws. Therefore, study on competition for these industries would be partial. 
Two measures of competition for industry level, the conventional measure of weighted price-
cost-margin (PCM) and the recently developed measure of profit elasticity (PE) are employed 
to examine levels and evolution of competition in Vietnam.  

















where pi is the price of firm i‟s output, ci its marginal cost and si the firm‟s market share in 
industry j in year t. 
                                            
5 There were about 44 million people, out of population of 86 million (GSO, 2010b), in working ages in 2009. 
However, only about 8.3 million working for firms (GSO, 2010a), the remaining of labour force are small 
economic householders such as farmers, fishermen, other unregistered micro self-employed households.  
The problem one faces with implementing this measure, however, is that marginal costs and 
prices in many cases are seldom observed in practice. Thus, in order to calculate PCM we use 
gross output (sales) and average variable costs instead: 
 
































where yit is gross output (sales) of firm i at time t, icit is intermediate costs, wit is labour cost, 
sit is the firm‟s market share in industry j in year t.    















  ln ln  
where total variables costs (tvci) are the sum of intermediate costs and labour costs.
6 
5. Empirical results 
In this section we look at competition in Vietnam industries, both how they compare across 
broad industries and how they have changed over time.  
Table 1 and Figure 1 show the aggregated 1-digit industry PCMs. In early 2000s, the least 
competitive  sectors  from  the  perspective  of  the  PCM  are  the  „Mining  and  quarrying‟, 
„Property business, R&D and consultancy services‟, „Transport, storage, travel services, post 
and telecommunications‟ and „Manufacturing‟. On the contrary, the mark-ups of the „Retail 
trade and individual and household appliance repairs‟, „Whole sales‟, „Sales and maintenance, 
repairs of motor vehicles and machinery and related services‟ and „Construction‟ are lowest 
suggesting that these industries have highest competition intensity.  
                                            
6 For more detail of the variables and their definitions, see Data Appendix.  
Table 1: PCM by one-digit industry level over the period 2000-2009 
PCM by ind1  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  Change 
Mining  0.298  0.338  0.205  0.163  0.166  0.135  0.120  0.133  0.096  0.077  -0.220 
Manu  0.133  0.107  0.082  0.071  0.054  0.046  0.040  0.035  0.029  0.027  -0.107 
Construction  0.012  0.007  0.005  0.001  0.004  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.000  0.001  -0.012 
Motorsales&repair  0.002  0.006  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001  -0.001 
Whole sales  0.006  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001  -0.004 
Retail  0.009  0.004  0.005  0.007  0.005  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001  -0.007 
Hotel&rest  0.036  0.061  0.051  0.022  0.020  0.020  0.011  0.020  0.017  0.011  -0.025 
Trans&comm  0.146  0.091  0.066  0.050  0.040  0.029  0.023  0.018  0.020  0.016  -0.129 
Finance  0.070  0.115  0.106  0.103  0.076  0.075  0.060  0.083  0.022  0.053  -0.017 
Property&consul  0.179  0.263  0.114  0.071  0.054  0.057  0.020  0.019  0.015  0.011  -0.168 
The PCMs declined in all studied industries over the study period (Figure 1), except in 2000-
2001 where we observed the PCM increase in some industries such as mining and quarrying; 
property business, R&D and consultancy services; finance and hotel and restaurants. This 
exception would be due to the effect of the first Enterprise Law in 2000; a large number of 
firms  were  established  including  the  formalization  of  unregistered  household  enterprises 
(Hakkala & Kokko, 2007). The formalization may make up the mark-ups immediately, but 
the effect of the law and massive entry of new firms in subsequent years has led to an increase 
in competition and lowering PCM. One interesting finding is that competition increased faster 
over  the  period  in  the  least  competitive  industries  in  the  beginning  of  study  period  (the 
„Change‟ column of Table 1). This is perceivable as the lift of business barriers would be 
conducted in the industries where there were significant business restrictions. For example, 
mining, telecommunications, transports, and business consultancy services were treated as 
(politically)  sensitive  industries  in  Vietnam;  they  were  state  monopolistic  and  had  higher 
PCMs until late 1990s. Then the strict barriers of entry in these industries have been gradually 
removed  in  2000s.  However,  the  PCMs  of  mining  and  quarrying,  finance  (banking)  and 
telecommunications industries are still higher than in other industries there still exist some 
certain entry barriers such as entry licencing and high start-up capital at the end of the study 
period.  
Figure 1: Vietnam industry average PCM (2000-2009) 
 
 
We  now  turn  out  to  apply  profit  elasticity  (PE)  to  measure  competition  intensity  in  the 
selected industries. It is worth noting that PE reflects how sensitivity of profits with respect to 
a unit change in average cost. In theory, the more competitive is the industry the higher (more 
negative)  is  the  PE.  However,  as  discussed  previously,  Boone  noted  that  comparing 
competition  between  industries  using  PE  may  be  nonsense,  but  changes  in  the  measured 
competition intensity over time within an industry can tell the trend of competition in that 
industry. Therefore, we pay more attention to the evolution of competition in the industries 
over time than comparing competition across industries.  
There is an improvement in competition level of all considered industries in Vietnam (the 
„Change‟ column of Table 2). The biggest absolute improvement is observed in „Finance‟, 
„Sales and maintenance, repairs of motor vehicles and machinery and related services‟, and in 
„Manufacturing. But the highest relative rise is in „Property business, R&D and consultancy 
services‟,  „Hotel  and  restaurants‟,  and  „Manufacturing  industries.  In  contrast,  the  least 
improvements both in terms of absolute and relative are found in „Mining and quarrying‟ and 
„Transport, storage, travel services,  post & telecommunications‟, though competition in these 
industries have steadily risen over the period (Figure 2).  
In 2009, industries such  as  mining & quarrying, construction, hotels  and restaurants,  and 
transport,  storage  and  communications  are  less  responsive  to  cost  changes  than  other 
industries such as finance, manufacturing and whole sales.  
Figure 2: Vietnam industry average PE (2000-2009) 
 
Table 2: PE by one-digit industry level over the period 2000-2009 
1-digt industry  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  Change 
Mining  -0.37  -1.07  -0.28  -0.23  -1.03  -0.43  -1.08  -0.52  -0.76  -1.12  -0.75 
Manu  -0.24  -0.43  -0.68  -0.95  -0.92  -0.91  -1.11  -1.71  -1.51  -2.12  -1.88 
Construction  0.35  0.17  -0.11  -0.02  -0.31  -0.38  -0.55  -0.92  -0.58  -1.17  -1.53 
Motorsales&repairs  0.65  0.28  -0.41  0.13  0.60  1.62  -0.45  -1.73  -2.21  -1.85  -2.49 
Whole sales  -0.56  -1.19  -0.93  -0.60  -1.30  -0.70  -1.54  -1.95  -1.71  -1.79  -1.23 
Retail  -0.19  -0.50  -0.15  0.18  0.33  0.29  -0.71  -0.68  -1.17  -1.57  -1.38 
Hotel&rest  0.05  -0.03  0.04  -0.02  -0.16  0.10  -0.14  -0.39  -0.37  -0.82  -0.87 
Trans&comm  -0.64  -0.69  -0.79  -0.99  -1.00  -0.81  -1.52  -0.72  -0.82  -1.21  -0.58 
Finance  -0.51  -3.42  -2.12  -4.23  -5.37  -2.23  -3.55  -2.60  -2.38  -3.54  -3.03 
Property&consul  -0.08  -2.04  -0.96  -1.29  -1.42  -1.60  -1.32  -1.41  -1.84  -1.48  -1.40 
Figure 2 also indicates that the introductions of the first Enterprise Law in 2000, Unified 
Enterprise Law in 2005, and the Competition Law in 2005 have pro-competitive effects. In 
both years 2000 and 2005 the competition became fiercer. All the curves except finance sector 
curve became steeper after 2005. Additionally, effect of the economic downturn started in 
2008 would be a potential underlying reason for a sharp decline (more negative) in PE in a 
period 2008-2009. The fast increase in competition in finance sector until 2004 would be due 
to entry of many new banks in the period until 2004 and loosen monetary policy particularly 
interest  rate  cuts  over  period  2001-2005  in  Vietnam  to  stimulate  economic  growth.  The 
tighten monetary policy to fight inflation and harder regulations on establishing new banks e.g. 
raised level of legal required capital since 2005 explain lower level of competition in this 
industry. It is worth noting that when the State Bank of Vietnam raises the base interest rate,
7 
commercial banks are able to lend at maximum 150% of the base rate, their competition is 
                                            
7 When there is inflation and credit demand pressurse.  
restrained by this regulation, on the other hand banks are able to compete with others by 
lowering the lending rates when there is no credit demand pressure in the capital market. 
To  consolidate  our  finding  on  the  improved  level  of  competition,  we  further  look  at 
competition measures at 4-digit industry level since one potential shortcoming of aggregated 
one-digit level PE measure is that the competition intensity of some 4-digit industries may not 
be improved even worsen but cancelled out by overwhelming intensity of other industries. 
Our implicit assumption that  the changes in the level of competition in 1-digit industries 
reflect the changes in the  component 4-digit industries may be undermined. Furthermore, 
fiercer competition in the 1-digit industry may be due to the fact that the component industries 
are  becoming  more  competitive,  or  may  be  due  to  the  more  competitive  industries  are 
growing  i.e.  economic  structure  change.  For  this  reason,  we  now  look  at  changes  in 
competition intensity in the component industries.  
Figures 3 and 4 show how competition has changed across 4-digit industries in Vietnam over 
2000-2009.  To get more smoothed changes in PCM and PE over the study period 2000-2009 
and minimize missing values, we estimate means of PCM and PE for two periods 2000-2001 
and  2008-2009.
8 As  competition  increases  firms‟  ability  to  mark-up  decreases,  but  the 
sensitivity of profits to average costs increases.  Therefore that a decline in PCM indicates an 
increase in competition whereas more negative PE indicates an increase in competition is 
expected.   
Both measures suggest that there is a larger group, about two thirds, of industries that appear 
to  have  an  improvement  in  competition.  This  group  of  industries  is  dominant  when 
considering PCM; but it is worth noting that there exists a significant group of industries in 
„Retail trade, individual and household appliance repairs‟, „Whole sales‟, and „Construction‟ 
sectors, about that of increased PCM group, have little changes in PCM as these industries 
had low PCMs already in the beginning of the study period. Therefore, it would be argued 
that that low mark-ups in the industries may not provide enough sufficient incentives for entry 
of new firms thus competition pressure has not increased much in the low PCM industries. 
                                            
8 Some industries those have no data on either of the two periods are removed, and to compare PCM and PE, we 
remove industries whose PEs are missing due to insufficient observations when estimating PE.  
Figure 3: Change in PCM by 4-digit level industry over 2000-2009 
 
Figure 4: Change in PE by 4-digit level industry over 2000-2009 
 
The predominant increasing trend of competitiveness over the period is also collaborated by 
the  profit  elasticity  measure.  This  finding  accords  well  with  other  studies  on  transition 
economies where pro-competitive policy such as economic restructure, privatization, increase 
in number of firms, economic openness are associated with levels of competition (Carlin, 
Fries, Schaffer & Seabright, 2001; Hersch et al, 1994; Vagliasindi, 2001), but different from 
developed  economies  such  as  New  Zealand,  the  Netherlands  where  there  are  ambiguous 
trends in competition evolution in the last decade as the markets are believed to be more 
mature (e.g. Creusen et al, 2006b; Devine et al, 2011).   
The two measures of competition roughly tell us a consistent story at an aggregated level. 
However, in some industries PE and PCM are not consistent in representing the competition 
intensity, they do not consist one another. In theory, one industry that a higher price-cost 
Mark-ups declined 
Mark-ups increased 
Became more competitive 
Became less competitive  
margin often has lower (in terms of magnitude) profit elasticity. Thus, PCM and PE would 
often be negatively related to one another. In other words, as competition increases firms‟ 
ability to mark-ups decreases, but the sensitivity of profits to average cost increases. Figures 5 
and 6 show a negative relationship between PCM and PE. In Figure 5 we use pooled data of 
two years 2000 and 2001 to estimate PCM and PE, and we name these PCM01 and PE01. 
This significantly negative relationship implies that these two measures of competition are 
complimentary in case of Vietnam industries in early stage of economic transition when the 
competition was still restrained. 














This correlation is consolidated when we look at the relationship between change in PCM and 
change in PE over 2000-2009. A simple regression coefficient of change in PCM on change 
in PE is negative 1.18 with a robust t-statistic of 3.25 suggesting that industries experienced a 
higher change in mark-ups were more responsive to average cost. 
However, by the end of the study period (2008-2009) the relationship between PCM and PE 
turns out to be ambiguous (Figure 6) as mark-ups of almost 1-digit industries in Vietnam have 
declined markedly and fell to low levels (see Figure 1 and Table 1). That means for many 4-
digit industries these two measures contradict one another in reflecting competition intensity. 
The  difference  between  these  two  measures  reflects  the  fact  that  in  some  industries  the 
reallocation effect dominates. The potential explanation would be that fiercer competition in 
later  stage  of  economic  transition  had  led  to  considerable  reallocation  of  market  shares 
amongst  firms  within  these  industries.  Fiercer  competition  may  result  in  market  share 
reallocation from inefficient firms  to more efficient firms.  That  is, PCM  still raises even 
PE01 = - 0.727 – 1.10PCM01 
            (t=3.63)    (t=3.24)  
competition  increases.  If  the  reallocation  effect  is  considerable,  PCM  no  longer  correctly 
represents the intensity of competition. This observation was well discussed and/or evidenced 
in Amir (2003), Boone (2000, 2008), Creusen et al. (2006a &2006b), Devine et al. (2011), 
and Stiglitz (1989).  















Note: Three extreme outliers of PCM are removed. 
Unlike PCM, PE is monotonic to competition regardless of the reallocation effect of market 
share as discussed in Boone (2000 & 2008). We expect reallocation effect to dominate in 
highly  competitive  industries  or  where  there  is  greater  dispersion  in  efficiency.  The 
inconsistency of these competition measures has been discussed in Creusen et al. (2006a), 
they  proposed  that  higher  dispersion  in  efficiency  levels  across  firms  within  an  industry 
creates a greater increase in the reallocation effect. Higher levels of product substitutability 
also increase the reallocation effects. Higher rate of entry into the market during the economic 
transition may also lead to an increase in competition, however, incorrectly identifies levels of 
competition by PCM.   
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper has considered the measurement of competition intensity and its evolution over the 
first decade of the twenty first century when some key important pro-competitive policies 
were implemented in Vietnam. We have employed two measures of competition – the Price-
Cost  Margin  and  Profit  Elasticity.  The  latter  is  claimed  to  be  robust  to  the  effects  of 
reallocation  and  selection  that  afflict  more  conventional  measures  used  in  the  empirical 
PE = -1.78 – 1.14PCM 
      (t=13.45)   (t=1.51)  
analysis of competition.  We calculate these two measures for a range of selected industries in 
Vietnam using ten Vietnam Enterprise Censuses initiated from 2000 by the General Statistical 
Office.   
The two measures of competition examined in this paper show that competition in Vietnam 
has increased significantly between 2000 and 2009. Generally, competition appears to have 
improved, particularly after introductions of the first Enterprise Law in 2000 and Unified 
Enterprise Law and Competition Law in 2005. The improvement in competition would be due 
to the massive rise in number of firms, from more than 42,000 in 2000 to more than 240,000 
firms  in  2009,  and  also  due  to  external  competition  as  Vietnam  had  deepened  economic 
integrity in 2000s particularly accession to WTO in 2006. The recent economic downturn in 
late 2000s has affected and created a more competitive pressure on firms.   
The  two  competition  measures  are  consistent  at  1-digit  aggregated  level  but  not  really 
complement well each other in some 4-digit industry level particularly in recent years when 
we believe that markets in Vietnam become more competitive.
9 Market shares and outputs are 
reallocated within a  market to more efficient firms.  Thus, reallocation and selection effect 
may blur the relationship between PE and PCM . The transition from a command to market 
economy in Vietnam provides a good opportunity to examine how consistent between PCM 
and  PE  in  measuring  competition .  In  early  economic  transition  the  markets  were  less 
competitive,  PCM  and PE are  consistent  or  they  are  complementary  indicators;  but  as 
competitiveness improves  and markets are more mature PCM becomes non -monotonic to 
competition levels.  
Intuitively the increase in number of firms and economic integrity or import penetration can 
be potential explanations to competitive evolution, but other factors such as privatization, pro-
competitive policies, and market entry barriers also have roles to play. However, this paper 
has not yet quantified contributions of these factors. Further work in this area should look at 
determinants of competition and dynamics of competition.   
                                            
9 In early stage of market development and economic transition there would be enough rooms both inputs and 
outputs for very firms so reallocation and selection effects may not be predominant.  
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Key variables used in this paper are defined as below. 
Sales of  goods  and services  (GO)  include total  sales of products  and  services,  and other 
incomes  excluding  fixed  asset  sales.  Profits  are  total  before-tax  profits.  Employment  is 
measured using an average over year beginning and ending employees and working proprietor 
counts. A working proprietor is assumed to be a person who (i) operates his or her own 
enterprise or engages independently in a profession or trade, and (ii) receives income from 
self-employment from which tax is deducted, but not from wages and salary.  
Fixed  assets  are  averaged  over  beginning  and  ending  year  values.  Depreciation  is  the 
difference between year-ending and year-beginning accumulated depreciation. Variable costs 
include  intermediate  costs  (IC)  and  labour  costs.  Labour  cost  includes  wages,  allowance, 
contribution  of  social  and  health  insurance,  and  union  fees  by  firms  for  employees.  The 
intermediate costs include materials, tools, fuel, electricity, water bills, transport expenses, 
postage, and insurance. As IC is not explicitly collected in the census, thus the IC is estimated 
as the difference between total sales minus sum of labour cost, capital cost (or capital services) 
and before-tax profits. Capital service cost is estimated as follows: 
Capital cost = Depreciation + interest rate*fixed asset 
where interest rate is yearly average interest rate, equals 150% of the State Bank of Vietnam 
base rate.  
 